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REFUGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
SANCTUARY MOVEMENT SHOULD USE
THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Paul Wickham Schmidt*
This Article will discuss whether the so-called sanctuary movement is a legitimate response to the problem of aliens entering the
United States illegally from Central American countries. First, the
legal process for the granting of refugee status, asylum, and withholding of deportation, and the definition of the various terms often
used in the sanctuary debate, will be examined. Then, the various
international instruments relating to claims of refuge and asylum
will be considered. Next, the concept of sanctuary will be discussed
in historical context. Finally, the Article will explore some of the
alternatives available to those who wish to lend support to aliens fleeing from Central America.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL PROCESS

A.

Refugee Status

A refugee is a person who is outside the country of his or her
nationality and "who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
* Deputy General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), United
States Department of Justice. B.A., Lawrence University, 1970; J.D., University of Wisconsin
Law School, 1973. Mr. Schmidt has been the Deputy General Counsel since 1978. He is currently serving as the Acting General Counsel, and he also served as the Acting General Counsel of the INS during the period 1979-81. Prior to joining the INS in 1976, Mr. Schmidt
served as an attorney adviser with the Board of Immigration Appeals.
This Article is an expansion of remarks made by Mr. Schmidt before the Center for
Migration Studies in Washington, D.C., on March 21, 1986, and the American Society of
International Law in Washington, D.C., on April 10, 1986. The views expressed in this Article
are Mr. Schmidt's own and do not necessarily represent the official position of the INS, the
Department of Justice, or any other government agency.
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."I' Under current United

States procedures,
refugee status can only be applied for outside the
2
States.
United
There is no specific statutory limitation upon the number of refugees who can be admitted in any year.3 Prior to the beginning of
each year, the number of refugees to be admitted to the United
States through the overseas refugee program is determined by the
President and the Congress through a process known as
consultation.
Not all refugees are eligible to be admitted to the United States
under the overseas refugee program. Only those refugees who are of
"special humanitarian concern" to the United States can apply.' The
consultation process helps the President and the Congress determine
which groups of refugees will be considered of special humanitarian
concern in any particular year. The number of refugee admissions is
allocated among those groups of refugees.'
For 1987, the Congress and the President agreed upon 70,000
as the total number of overseas refugee admissions. Of these, 40,500
admissions are earmarked for refugees from East Asia; 10,000 are
for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; 8,000 are for the Near
East and South Asia; 4,000 are for Latin America and the Caribbean; 3,500 are for Africa; and 4,000 are in an unallocated reserve.8
Although the primary emphasis in the Latin American allocation
continues to be former political prisoners, mostly Cuban, there is an
attempt to broaden9 availability to other nationalities, specifically
Central Americans.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(42)(1982) [hereinafter INA].

2. 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (1987).
3. INA § 207(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (1982) ("[T]he number of refugees who
may be admitted ... in any fiscal year ... shall be such number as the President determines
is justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest.").

4. Id. § 207(a)(2), (d), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2), (d).
5. Id. § 207(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § I157(a)(3).
6. Id.
7. Presidential Determination No. 87-1, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,637 (1986).
8. Statement of Thomas C. Ferguson, Deputy Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, concerning Refugee Consultations

for Fiscal Year 1987, at I (Sept. 26, 1986).
9.

Id. at 3. The INS Deputy Commissioner, Thomas C. Ferguson, described the purpose

of the proposed allocation of 4,000 refugees for Central America and the Caribbean:
Finally, the proposed allocation of 4,000 for Latin America should signal our

continuing interest in restoring the 1984 Migration Agreement with Cuba. At the
same time, our proposal allows us to extend the opportunity for resettlement to
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Thus, an alien fleeing from a Central American country has
only a limited opportunity to participate in the United States refugee

program.1" He could, of course, seek refuge in a country other than
the United States. Otherwise, if he wished to be admitted to the

United States legally, he would have to fit within the normal immigration requirements, or be granted asylum.
B.

Asylum Process

Any alien physically present at the border or within the United
States can apply to the Attorney General for asylum.1" Asylum may
be granted to an alien who establishes that he meets the refugee

definition,1 2 unless that alien has been firmly resettled in another
country, committed certain types of aggravated misconduct, or
would present a danger to the security of the United States.13 An

alien claiming a well-founded fear of persecution1 4 within the meaning of the refugee definition must show something more than the fact

that civil war or general conditions of random violence prevail in his
other nationalities in the region. Among the 300,000 refugees in Central America
there are some for whom resettlement outside the region may be the only solution.
The United States will participate in a resettlement program for these refugees. It is
significant to note that INS has granted asylum to more than 3,000 Central American refugees since 1984; grants by immigration judges have added to those numbers. Clearly a small resettlement program will further demonstrate our commitment to refugees from that region.
Id.
10. Id.
11. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
12. See supra text accompanying note 1.
13. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1) (1987). This regulation sets forth certain regulatory preclusions to a grant of asylum by a district director. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(ii) bars aliens who
have been firmly resettled in a foreign country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(l)(iii)-(vi) incorporates
the statutory bars on withholding of deportation contained in INA § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h)(2) (1982). See infra note 18. The Board of Immigration Appeals has stated: "Although those regulations are addressed to the District Director and are not binding on this
Board, we consider them as useful guidelines in the exercise of discretion over asylum requests." In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (BIA 1982). In fact, however, the Board has
treated the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1) in almost exactly the same way as binding
eligibility requirements. See, e.g., In re Carballe, Int. Dec. No. 3007 (BIA Feb. 13, 1986)
(asylum may be denied without full evidentiary hearing where alien is ineligible for withholding under INA § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1982), because of particularly
serious crimes committed in the United States). The author is unaware of any case in which
the Board has granted asylum to an alien who fit within 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0)(1). But see Arauz
v. Rivklind, No. 86-0298 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 1986) (immigration judge must conduct a full
evidentiary hearing on asylum claim even if alien clearly fits within 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(0(1)).
14. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a
"well founded fear" of persecution was something less than proving that persecution was
"more likely than not." See discussion infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:79

home country. 15

Even if an alien establishes that he is a refugee, and is therefore
eligible for asylum, the decision whether or not to grant asylum is
discretionary with the Attorney General's delegees.18 An applicant
becomes an asylee only when that determination is made by the Attorney General's delegees, and not before.11 An alien, however, who
is found eligible for asylum, but who is denied that relief for discretionary reasons, may still not be forcibly returned to a country where
it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted.18 Discretionary
denial of asylum occurs principally in cases of Afghans who have
been given refuge in Pakistan, and who then evade overseas refugee
processing by coming to the United States with false or otherwise
improper documentation. 9
15. See, e.g., Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986); ZepedaMelendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1984); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 143334 (9th Cir. 1984); Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523, 1527-28 (D.C. Cir. 1983); MartinezRomero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982). The original version of the Senate bill
that later became the Refugee Act of 1980 contained a refugee definition that included persons "displaced by military or civil disturbance or uprooted because of arbitrary detention." S.
643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1979). However, the Refugee Act of 1980, as finally
enacted, did not include such "displaced persons" in the refugee definition. See In re Acosta,
Int. Dec. No. 2986, slip op. at 18, n.10 (BIA March 1, 1985).
16. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(2) (1987); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1219, 1222 (1987).
17. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1580-81 (S.D. Tex. 1985). See United
States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954-57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1603 (1987); United
States v. Pereira-Pineda, 721 F.2d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1983). Some sanctuary advocates
have claimed that aliens are automatically "refugees" and "asylees" without any determination by the government. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of sections 207(c)(1) and 208(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(1), 1158(a) (1982), and was
rejected by the courts in Elder, Merkt, and Pereira-Pineda.
18. INA § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982). This section does provide exceptions to the rule of non-return for persecutors, id. § 243(h)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A);
certain serious criminals, id. § 243(h)(2)(B), (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B), (C); and security
risks, Id. § 243(h)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(D).
19. See Infra note 48. The Board of Immigration Appeals has stated:
An alien who circumvents the orderly procedures for obtaining refugee status is
not precluded from obtaining a discretionary grant of asylum. However, . . . the
alien must establish that he has sufficient countervailing equities to warrant the
favorable exercise of discretion. Generally, it will be necessary to balance the positive and negative factors in each case, particularly where a finding of fraud is not
involved.
In re Gharadaghi, Int. Dec. No. 3001, slip op. at 5 (B.I.A. Nov. 1, 1985).
Since there has been no established overseas refugee program for Central Americans
other than certain former and present political prisoners, this particular rationale does not
appear to have much, if any, applicability to Central American asylum claims. Cf. DamaizeJob v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure of Miskito Indian fleeing from
Nicaragua to claim asylum in first country in which he arrived not a basis to doubt the credi-
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An alien who is maintaining a lawful status in the United States
can apply to an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) district director for asylum. 0 Other aliens in the United States, or at a
border port, can also apply for asylum to a district director, so long
as no formal proceedings to exclude them or deport them from the
United States have been instituted.2
Before the district director, the applicant is entitled to be represented by counsel of his choice (at no expense to the government),22
to present evidence in support of his application,23 and to receive a
written decision. 24 Although there is no appeal of a district director's
decision denying asylum, 25 the application can be renewed in an exclusion or deportation proceeding before an immigration judge.2 An
alien who presents a nonfrivolous application for asylum to either a
district director or an immigration judge may be granted authorization to work, by the district director, during the pendency of the
application.27
Most aliens who come to the United States from Central
America outside of the legal immigration system, enter the country
illegally without inspection. It is therefore likely that if encountered
by the INS, they would be placed in deportation proceedings, and
bility of asylum claim). It remains to be seen whether under the 1987 allocation a formal

refugee program will be established for Central America, and if so, what effect that will have
on discretionary asylum denials. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1(a), 208.3(a) (1987). See generally GENERAL AccT. OFF.. ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DE-

PORTED (1987) (Briefing Report to the Honorable Arlen Specter, United States Senate), for a

recent critique of the asylum adjudication process.
21.

8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.3 (1987). The promulgation of 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 is being

challenged in the Central District of California. Hunter v. INS, No. CV 85-4425-FFF (GX)
(C.D. Cal. filed July 8, 1985).

22. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (1987).
23.
24.

Id. §§ 208.5, 208.6.
Id. § 208.8(b). Two courts have ruled that the district director's denial of asylum is

not judicially reviewable because the alien still has the remedy of renewing the application in
deportation or exclusion proceedings. Kashani v. Nelson, 793 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

107 S. Ct. 644 (1986); Yim Tong Chung v. Smith, 640 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In
Kashani, the Seventh Circuit also accepted the government's argument that the district direc-

tor's asylum decision was an unreviewable political question. 793 F.2d at 828.
25. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1987).
26.

Id.

27. 8 C.F.R.

§§ 109.1(b)(2), 208.4 (1987). Employment authorization has become par-

ticularly significant with the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,

Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.), prohibiting the
knowing employment of unauthorized aliens. See generally Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638

(E.D. Cal. 1986), for a discussion of some of the legal issues pertaining to work authorization
in the asylum context.
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would not have access to the asylum process before the district director.2 8 Nevertheless, they would be able to apply for asylum before an
immigration judge and would obtain procedural rights and safeguards greater than those which attend the district director asylum
process.29
An immigration judge is a quasi judicial officer who is not an
employee of the INS. Immigration judges work for the Executive
Office for Immigration Review within the Department of Justice.30
Their sole function is to preside and make decisions at various trial
type hearings conducted under the immigration laws.31 While some
of the immigration judges are former INS attorneys, some of the
more recent appointments came from private practice, nonprofit or
legal aid groups, state court systems, or other government agencies.
An alien appearing before an immigration judge is entitled to be
represented by counsel of his choice.3 2 Although the law prohibits
the government from appointing counsel in exclusion and deportation
cases,33 all aliens appearing before immigration judges are given lists
of local organizations which have stated that they will provide free
legal services to aliens.3 4
During the hearing, the alien asylum applicant can present testiiony, documentary evidence, witnesses, and legal arguments in
support of his application. 5 He can cross examine any witnesses for
the government and can rebut any other evidence presented by the
government. 38 The alien is entitled to a reasoned decision from the
28. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1987).
29. See INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1982); id. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b); 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.10, 236.2, 236.3, 242.16, 242.17(c) (1987).
30. 8 C.F.R. § 3.0 (1986).
31. Id.
32. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982); Rules of Procedure for Proceedings Before
Immigration Judges, 52 Fed. Reg. 2931, 2937 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.15).
33. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982); Rules of Procedure for Proceedings Before
Immigration Judges, 52 Fed. Reg. 2931, 2937 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.15). But
see Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 787 F.2d 1294, 1297 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (dictum) (indicating that in

certain cases fifth amendment due process may require appointment of counsel for indigent
aliens).
34. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2(a), 292(a) (1987).
35.

Id. 22 208.10(c), 236.2(a), 242.16(a).

36. Id. §2 236.2(a), 242.16(a). The views of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) of the Department of State on the asylum application are requested
by either the district director or the immigration judge, or both. Id. § 208.7. Unless classified,
which is rare, the opinion is placed in the record and the applicant is given an opportunity to
inspect, explain, and rebut the opinion if adverse to his application. Id.
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immigration judge.3 7
If the alien is dissatisfied with the immigration judge's decision,
he can appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 38 Like the immigration judges, the Board is part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review and is entirely separate from the INS.39 A decision
by the Board against the alien can be reviewed in United States
courts by life tenured federal judges.4 0 Eventually, review can be
sought in the United States Supreme Court.
An alien who is granted asylum can remain in the United
States. Eventually, such an alien will have a chance to apply for adjustment to lawful permanent resident alien status.41
On March 30, 1987, the Department of Justice established a
new Asylum Policy and Review Unit.42 The purpose of this unit, located within the Department's Office of Legal Policy, is "to advise
the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General on matters related to asylum policy

. .

.

,"

and to "compile information relevant

to asylum decisions and to coordinate asylum matters with the Immigration and Naturalization Service." 43 The Attorney General took
this action to promote uniformity in asylum decision making, and to
assure consistency with statutory and judicially established standards
for asylum. 44 The Attorney General stated that the establishment of
a separate office within the Department to oversee asylum policy recognized the fact "that the decision to grant asylum to an alien is
inherently a humanitarian act by the United States that is distinct
from the normal operation and administration of the immigration
laws." 45
The final rule establishing this office was the result of a year37. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.5, 242.18 (1987); Rules of Procedure for Proceedings Before Immigration Judges, 52 Fed. Reg. 2931, 2935 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.35).
38. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b), 236.7, 242.21 (1987); Rules of Procedure for Proceedings Before
Immigration Judges, 52 Fed. Reg. 2931, 2938 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.36).

39. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(l) (1987).
40.

INA § 106(a), (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), (b) (1982). Review of deportation cases is

by petition for review, directly to a United States court of appeals. Id. Review of exclusion
cases is by habeas corpus filed in a United States district court. Id.
41. Id. § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). Adjustments to lawful permanent resident alien
status under this section are limited to 5,000 in any fiscal year. Id. This may be indicative of a
congressional belief that only a relatively small number of aliens would qualify for asylum in

the United States.
42. Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,043-44 (1987) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.15(0,
0.105(k), 0.23(b)).
43. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release (Apr. 7, 1987) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).

44.
45.

Id.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:79

long departmental study involving the INS and the Executive Office
of Immigration
Review (EOIR), as well as the Office of Legal Policy." ° Among other functions, the Asylum Policy and Review Unit
will:
- Compile and disseminate to INS Officers information concerning the persecution of persons in other countries on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
Review cases decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals.4'
- Review INS asylum decisions in cases which the Deputy Attorney General directs the INS to refer to him.
- Assist INS in conducting 48training concerning asylum and assist
in resolving policy questions.
C. Withholding of Deportation
In addition to the provisions relating to asylum, the law provides
that no alien can be deported or removed from the United States to
a country where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 4 9 This is called withholding of
deportation.
Unlike asylum, which is discretionary, the Attorney General's
delegees must grant withholding of deportation to an alien who establishes that he meets the statutory criteria, unless that alien has
committed, or is reasonably believed to have committed outside the
United States, certain aggravated offenses, or constitutes a danger to
the security of the United States. 50 The granting of withholding of
deportation does not guarantee that an alien will be permitted to
remain in the United States. Since withholding of deportation is
country specific, the alien could still be removed to a third country
which would accept him and where he would not be persecuted.5 1
Withholding of deportation does not confer any52right to become a
lawful permanent resident alien at a later time.
46. Id.
47. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(l)(i) (1987).
48. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 43. These functions are codified at 28 C.F.R. §
0.15(0, as added by Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,043, 11,044 (1987).
49. Id. § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
50. Id. § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2).
51. In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982); Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Shirdel, Int. Dec. No. 2958 (BIA Feb. 21, 1984).
52. See, e.g., Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing
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The Supreme Court has held that an alien seeking withholding

of deportation must establish that it is "more likely than not" that
he will be persecuted for one of the five specified reasons. 53 The gov-

ernment applied this same standard of proof to asylum applications, 54 while several courts of appeals held that the standard for
asylum was something less than "more likely than not." 55 Recently,
the Supreme Court held that the standard for asylum is something
less than "more likely than not." 56 Although leaving the precise
standard for later articulation on a case by case basis, the Court
suggested that a "moderate" interpretation would find a "well

founded fear" whenever evidence established an objective situation
where persecution was a "reasonable possibility. ' 57 The Court also
reiterated that even when the "refugee" standard is satisfied, the Attorney General still retains discretion to grant or deny asylum.58
D. Extended Voluntary Departure
The term "extended voluntary departure" often comes up in
connection with the debate over the treatment of aliens entering ille-

gally from Central America. Extended voluntary departure is somewhat of a misnomer, since it does not relate to the statutory and

regulatory provisions on "voluntary departure" under the immigration laws. 59 Rather, it refers to a nonstatutory exercise of
some of the differences between asylum and withholding of deportation).
53. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
54. In re Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, slip op. at 25-28 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985). The Third
Circuit has agreed with the Board's interpretation. Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1985); Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984).
55. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), affid, 107 S. Ct.
1207 (1987); Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986); Guevara Flores v. INS,
786 F.2d 1242, 1250 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1565 (1987); Yousif v. INS, 794
F.2d 236, 243 (6th Cir. 1986); Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984);
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984) (dictum). But see Reyes v. INS,
747 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985); Nasser v. INS, 744 F.2d
542 (6th Cir. 1984); Daily v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir. 1984), in which-the Sixth Circuit
equates the standard of proof in asylum cases with that in withholding of deportation cases.
56. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1212 (1987).
57. Id. at 1217-18. All courts to have considered the issue agree that some showing must
be made of an objective basis for the fear of persecution. See, e.g., Vides-Vides v. INS, 783
F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986); Quintanilla-Ticas v. INS, 783 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1986);
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984); Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360,
362 (6th Cir. 1984).
58. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1219, 1222.
59. INA §§ 242(b), 244(e), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1254(e) (1982); 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.5,
244.1 (1987). The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that immigration judges lack the
authority to grant extended voluntary departure on a nationality basis. In re Rosa Elba Vas-
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prosecutorial discretion by the Attorney General not to remove certain classes of otherwise deportable aliens. 0 It is usually granted on
a nationality basis after consultation with, or advice from, the State
Department."'
Currently, grants of extended voluntary departure are in effect
for various classes of aliens from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Poland.62 The aliens benefitting from the most recent of these grants,
such as Poles, must have arrived in the United States prior to a particular date in the past.63 This minimizes the incentive for illegal
migration by prospective recipients of extended voluntary departure.
The Secretary of State has considered the possibility of recommending extended voluntary departure for El Salvadorans, and has
specifically declined to do so.64 In July, 1983, Attorney General William French Smith, after considering the Secretary of State's views,
determined that the circumstances did not warrant the grant of extended voluntary departure to Salvadorans. 5
Both the Attorney General and the Secretary of State pointed
to United States efforts to improve the situation in El Salvador, the
proximity of El Salvador, and to the historic pattern of illegal migration from that country, as reasons for not deeming extended voluntary departure to be appropriate.66 The Attorney General also
pointed to the existence of the asylum and withholding of deportaqucz Limares, No. A26 949 758 (BIA Mar. 27, 1986) (decision on file with author).
60. See Hotel & Restaurant Emp. Union Local 25 v. Attorney Gen., 804 F.2d 1256,
1270-72 (1986), vacated, 808 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
61. Id.

62. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit E, Hotel & Restaurant
Emp. Union Local 25 v. Attorney Gen., 804 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Defend-

ant's Motion). Extended voluntary departure for Ugandans which had been in effect since
June 8, 1978, was terminated on September 30, 1986, in light of the State Department's view

that conditions had sufficiently stabilized. Memorandum from Hugh J. Brien, Assistant Commissioner Detention and Deportation, INS, to INS field offices (July 31, 1986) (on file with
author).
63. Afghanistan, arrivals prior to June 30, 1980; Ethiopia, arrivals prior to June 30,
1980, Defendant's Motion, supra note 62. Currently, Polish nationals who were in the United
States as of July 21, 1984, have been given extended voluntary departure until June 30, 1987.

Telex from John C. Higgins, Assistant Commissioner, Detention and Deportation, INS, to
INS field offices (Dec. 23, 1986) (on file with author).

64. Defendant's Motion, supra note 62, Exhibit C (Letter from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, to William French Smith, Attorney General (June 23, 1983)) [hereinafter
Schultz Letter].
65. Defendant's Motion, supra note 62, Exhibit D (Letter from William French Smith,
Attorney General, to Congressman Lawrence J. Smith (July 19, 1983)) [hereinafter Smith
Letter].
66. Schultz Letter, supra note 64; Smith Letter, supra note 65.
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tion processes as alternatives for Salvadorans who legitimately fear
persecution.67
Several bills were introduced during the last Congress which
would have required the Attorney General to grant extended voluntary departure to undocumented aliens from El Salvador. 8 In fact,
the House-passed version of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 contained a provision requiring the Attorney General to
grant temporary stays of deportation to nationals of El Salvador and
Nicaragua pending receipt of, and congressional action on, a report
by the General Accounting Office on the situation of such displaced
nationals.69 The Senate-passed version of the same bill contained no
such provision. The Conference Committee considering the bill deleted this provision, and thus it did not become a part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 as enacted.70 That Act did,
however, provide that illegal aliens who had resided in the United
States since prior to January 1, 1982, and aliens who had resided in
the United States and worked in seasonal agricultural occupations
for at least 90 man-days between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986,
could qualify to have their immigration status in the United States
legalized.7 1 New bills relating to extended voluntary departure for
Central Americans have been introduced in the 100th Congress. 2
67. Smith Letter, supra note 65.
68. See, e.g., S. 377, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. § 1028 (daily ed. Feb. 5,
1985); H.R. 822, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H216 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1985);
Cohedas, Salvadoran Sanctuary Measure Sent to Committee on Tie Vote, 44 CONG. Q. 860
(1986); Kaplan, Salvadoran Refugees Get Reprieve, 44 CONG. Q. 1750 (1986).
69. H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 821, 139 CONG. REC. H9801, H9826 (daily ed.
Oct. 10, 1986).
70. H.R. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1986). In rejecting the proposal for
extended voluntary departure, the Conference Committee stated:
The Conference substitute deletes the provision. The Conferees believe that deportations should be suspended on a case-by.case basis in cases such as El Salvador
where natural disasters have added to other societal problems in a manner which
adds significantly to the difficulties inherent in the resettlement of deportees.
Nothing in this statement is intended to set a precedent for ignoring the basic
standards set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980.
The Conferees strongly recommended that Congress consider and take up this
issue expeditiously next Congress.
Id.
71. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sees. 201, 301,
§§ 245A, 210, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1255A, 1180).
72. Battle Expected in Congress Over Asylum for Salvadorans, The Miami Herald,
Feb. 2, 1987, at AI0, col. 4. Recently, President Reagan rejected a request from El Salvador's
President Duarte that Salvadorans who are in the United States illegally be permitted to stay.
President Reagan cited the undesirable precedent that would be set by such action. President
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INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

United Nations Convention

The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
of 1967 (Protocol) was acceded to by the United States in 1968.73 It
incorporates most of the provisions of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, 7" to which the
United States was not a signatory.
The Protocol does not deal with the question of what refugees
should be selected for admission to a particular country. In other
words, it does not set up standards or guidelines for overseas refugee
programs. It does, however, deal with the rights that should be accorded to refugees lawfully within a contracting state 5 and, to some
extent, with the rights that should be afforded to refugees who are
unlawfully within a contracting state.7 6
The most relevant provision of the Convention, other than the
refugee definition, provides that, with certain exceptions for aggravated offenders, "No contracting State shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
77
group or political opinion."
Congress, in enacting the asylum and withholding of deportation provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980, implemented this provision of the Protocol and Convention.7 8 The government has taken the
Duarte had expressed fear that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 would cause
the return of thousands of Salvadorans thereby harming the fragile Salvadoran economy. U.S.
Won't Let Illegal SalvadoransStay, 45 Cong. Q. 1027 (1987).
73. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (entered into force for United States, Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter
Protocol].
74. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention was designed
to deal with individuals who had become refugees before January 1, 1951. The purpose of the

Protocol was to update the original Convention to extend it to individuals acquiring refugee
status after January 1, 1951. It incorporates articles 2 through 34 of the Convention. Protocol

supra note 73, art. I, at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
75. Protocol, supra note 73; Convention, supra note 74.
76. Convention, supra note 74, art. 31, at 6275, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. at
174.
77. Convention, supra note 74, art. 33, at 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. at
176.
78.

Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified

at 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982)).
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position that the Protocol and Convention are not self-executing, that
is, that they are implemented in domestic law only to the extent that
Congress has passed specific legislation embodying their terms.
Courts have generally agreed with this position.80
The "classical" definition of a refugee as an individual fleeing
direct persecution or having a well founded fear of persecution on
one of five specified grounds, is contained in the Convention,81 the
Protocol, 82 and the Refugee Act of 1980.3 The latter uses this definition in its overseas refugee and asylum provisions." Aliens in the
United States or at its borders who can establish that they meet this
definition may be granted asylum.8 5 At the very least, an alien who
can establish that it is more likely than not that he will suffer persecution will have his deportation to a country where he faces persecution withheld. 86
A number of United Nations resolutions, however, have extended the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) beyond the classical refugee definition to encompass "persons displaced from their countries because of severe
internal upheaval or armed conflict (externally displaced persons in a
refugee-like situation). ' ' 87 These so-called "mandate refugees" are
not included within the Convention and Protocol and are not recognized as refugees under United States law.88
Mandate refugee status is determined by the UNHCR on a
group, rather than an individual case, basis:
Thus UNHCR has determined on a group basis that all
Salvadorans in the camps of Honduras and all Guatemalans in the
79.

See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir.

1987); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 964 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 U.S. 1603
(1987); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982); Pierre v. United States, 547
F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 434 U.S. 962 (1977); United States
v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (S.D. Tex. 1985); Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F.
Supp. 1396, 1405-06 (D.D.C. 1985), affid on other grounds, 807 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13, 26-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
80. See cases cited supra note 79.
81. Convention, supra note 74, art. 1, at 6261, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
82. Protocol, supra note 73, art. I, at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
83. Refugee Act of 1980, sec. 201(a), § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10 and 11-48.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 11-48.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
87. Letter from Joachim Henkel, Deputy Representative, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to Ronald Brooks, District Director, INS Seattle District
(Oct. 16, 1985) [hereinafter Brooks Letter] (on file with author).
88. See id.
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settlements of Chiapas, Campeche and Quintana Roo in Mexico
are refugees. UNHCR, however, has not adopted the position that
all Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the United States are refugees, even in the broader sense-a certain percentage may well
come exclusively for economic reasons.89
The UNHCR has continued to urge that the United States permit mandate refugees to remain here either on a group or an individual basis, until the situation in Central America has stabilized and it
is safe to return.90 The UNHCR has recognized that such determinations would be beyond the scope of the asylum or withholding provisions of the United States' immigration laws and would require either the decision to grant extended voluntary departure, or some
other form of discretionary decision to temporarily forego enforcement of departure. 91
B.

Other International Instruments and Customary International
Law

A number of claims have been advanced that other international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights92 and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Civilian Persons in Time of War,93 give aliens certain additional
rights under United States domestic law. The government has taken
the view, and the courts have consistently held, that these documents
are not self-executing treaties, and that the Immigration and Nationality Act is the exclusive source of rights for aliens who claim a
legal entitlement to remain in the United States.94
One United States district court has concluded that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is merely a non-binding resolution
which creates no cause of action for any individual.9 5 An immigration judge has found that the Geneva Convention IV may have ap89. Id.
90. Id.; Letter from Joachim Henkel, Deputy Representative, UNHCR, to Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner, INS (Oct. 28, 1985) [hereinafter Nelson Letter] (on file with author).
91. Nelson Letter, supra note 90; Brooks Letter, supra note 87.
92. G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948).
93. Opened for Signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 286 (entered into force for U.S., Aug. 30, 1956).
94. See cases cited supra note 79.
95. Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1405 (D.D.C. 1985), afd on
other grounds, 807 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that even assuming the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
created a right of recovery, it could only be exercised where the detention was arbitrary).
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plicability in immigration proceedings, although relief was denied in
the individual case.96 This matter is97 now pending on appeal before
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Almost all courts to have considered the matter have rejected
customary international law as a source of immigration rights for
aliens in the United States, in light of the pervasive legislative and
executive pronouncements in the area of immigration.98
III.

WHAT IS "SANCTUARY?"

Sanctuary, or the ability of an individual accused of crime to
seek temporary refuge in a particular city or on religious property,
had its origins in biblical times.99 It appeared as a mitigating response to the rather harsh rule of blood vengeance which prevailed
under the then existing legal system.1 00 The granting of sanctuary
assumed, if not innocence, then at least lack of premeditation." 1 The
result was not a complete forgiveness of the act and the ability to go
freely among the population at large, but restriction of movement to
10 2
a particular sanctuary city.
In its later forms in England, sanctuary involved a limited period of protection on church property, and then permanent banishment from the country. 0 3a As stated by one authority:
Rather than being forced to pay compensation to satisfy the Anglo96. In re Jesus Del Carmen Medina, File No. A26 949 415 (Immigration Court, Harlingen, Texas July 25, 1985), appeal docketed (decision on file with author).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 964 n.16 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1603 (1987); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982); Singh
v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); cf. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th
Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (excluded aliens may only challenge the
decisions of executive officials under rights conferred by Congress and the Chief Executive).
But see Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798-800 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom.,
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (district court found that
the Government's detention of excludable Cubans violated customary international law, but
the appellate court did not reach that issue).
In Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986),
the court found that international law was not controlling in light of the executive actions and
judicial decisions establishing the government's authority to detain excludable aliens.
99. For detailed discussions of the historical development of the law of sanctuary, see
generally I. BAU, THIs GROUND IS HOLY 124-83 (1985), and Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretationof an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 747 (1986).
100. 1. BAU, supra note 99, at 125-27; Carro, supra note 99, at 749-51.
101. I. BAU, supra note 99, at 125; Carro, supra note 99, at 750-51.
102. I. BAU, supra note 99, at 125-27; Carro, supra note 99, at 750-51.
103. I. BAU, supra note 99, at 144-50; Carro, supra note 99, at 759-63.
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Saxon law of bloodfeud, the sanctuary seeker now had to submit to
the operation of the criminal law. Limiting private revenge was no
longer the primary purpose of sanctuaries. Instead, sanctuaries had
become part of the criminal law, facilitating the imposition of the
sentence of banishment without trial. Sanctuary seekers who abjured the realm chose this punishment instead of punishment after
trial. In this sense, the abjuration of the realm was a refinement of
the law of outlawry.x°0
As a result of abuses, Parliament abolished sanctuary by statute
in 1624.105

Unlike England, there has never been a legal concept of sanctuary in the United States.108 To the extent that there has been any
embodiment of the sanctuary tradition in our legal system, it is in
the warrant requirements and the prohibitions on unreasonable
searches and seizures contained in the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 0 7 Some of the concerns with the reasonableness of the legal system that were reflected in the biblical and
English concepts of sanctuary 0 " are also addressed in the fifth
amendment to the Constitution. 0 9
There is very little apparent connection between the so-called
"sanctuary movement" and the historic principles of sanctuary.1 10
The sanctuary movement seeks the recognition of the right of individuals who have entered or remain in the United States in violation
104.
105.
106.

I. BAU, supra note 99, at 144.
1.BAU, supra note 99, at 157; Carro, supra note 99, at 766.
1.BAU, supra note 99, at 172; See Carro, supra note 99, at 768.

107. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-

rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.

108. Carro, supra note 99, at 767.
109. The fifth amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. Co NsT. amend. V.

110. See Carro, supra note 99, at 767-68.
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of the immigration laws to be exempt from those laws, and to live
and work here indefinitely. This bears little resemblance to the medieval English concept of sanctuary which primarily involved criminals
who admitted their crimes and were given a very limited temporary
protection on certain church property before being banished for life
and losing their property to the crown.""" Unlike the sanctuary
movement, the English tradition was carried out with either the active or tacit consent of the civil authorities and was, to a large extent, an adjunct to the criminal laws of England. 2
Nor does the sanctuary movement bear a striking resemblance
to the biblical tradition of sanctuary. The biblical tradition appears
to be a response to a legal system which had not developed to the
point of being able to adequately protect members of society against
"self-help" justice, and that did not recognize self defense or lack of
criminal intent as defenses to homicide. 1 An analogous situation
does not exist in the United States, where our democratically established legal system has a myriad of procedural protections to insure
that individual rights are respected.1 1
There is an American historical tradition that appears to be related to some aspects of the sanctuary movement. This is the tradition of civil disobedience.11 5 Its roots can be traced from the abolitionist movement through the antiwar movement. 1 The refusal of
certain aspects of the sanctuary movement to accept the law, or to
work within the system to change results which they perceive as unfair or unjust, does resemble some aspects of other American movements involving intentional disregard of the law as a tactic.
As aptly stated by one commentator: "Today, the sanctuary
movement also presents a significant challenge to the assumption
that government is sovereign regarding immigration policy. Now individual citizens are implementing their own alien admission system
and offering asylum outside the usual governmental processes."111 In
other words, the sanctuary movement advocates a "do it yourself"
immigration policy under which each individual is guided by the dictates of his conscience as to which aliens should be admitted.
111. See I. BAU, supra note 99, at 144-57; Carro, supra note 99, at 759-67.
112. I. BAU, supra note 99, at 149-50; Carro, supra note 99, at 767.
113. See . BAU, supra note 99, at 125; Carro, supra note 99, at 749-51.
114. See supra notes 107, 109 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the
constitutional protections of individual rights.
115. See 1. BAu, supra note 99, at 160-71.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 180. Mr. Bau views this development favorably.
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ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO SANCTUARY ADVOCATES

The "do it yourself" immigration movement might have at least
some theoretical validity in a system where no viable alternatives exist. Thus, in order to judge the reasonableness of the sanctuary
movement in the United States, it is necessary to re-examine some of
the alternatives which exist under our legal system, as described earlier in this Article,"1 " for individuals who disagree with the government's actions concerning illegal immigration from Central America.
First, the existing legal system clearly permits legal assistance
to individuals raising asylum and withholding of deportation
claims.111 Although Congress has specifically prohibited the appointment of counsel at government expense in civil immigration proceedings, 2 ° groups can, and have been able to, retain attorneys to help
asylum applicants to present their cases and to pursue appellate
21

remedies.
Statistically, the government has prevailed in the vast majority
of asylum cases litigated in both the administrative and judicial system.122 While this is no doubt seen by sanctuary advocates as resulting from pro-government bias in the system, it is more likely a reflection of the fact that the correct legal standards are being
applied.1 23 It is highly illogical to assume that federal court judges,
118. See supra text accompanying notes 1-67.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 11-58.
120. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
121. See supra text accompanying note 34.
122. According to Robert Bombaugh, Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, Department of Justice, during fiscal year 1985 the government prevailed in 87.3% of
the cases decided by three judge panels of the courts of appeals. The government success rate
for asylum cases during fiscal year 1985 was 85.4%. During the first six months of fiscal year
1986, the government prevailed in 88.8% of the court of appeals cases, and 83.9% of the asylum cases. The balance of the cases do not necessarily constitute "losses" for the government,
since they include withdrawals, settlements, remands, and other types of non-definitive resolutions. A total of fifty-six asylum cases were decided by the courts of appeals in the first six
months of fiscal year 1986, as opposed to forty-one during the entire fiscal year 1985. Conversation with Robert Bombaugh, Director, Office of Immigration Litigation (April 16, 1986).
123. The only study to determine the fate of the Salvadoran deportees found no substantial evidence of harm to those returned. The study, conducted by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), looked at the cases of 4,882 returnees and kept touch with more
than seventy-nine percent of them:
Both in initial and follow-up contacts, "the large majority" of returnees said
their "primary motives" for going to the United States were the "poor economic
situation in El Salvador and the wish to find employment abroad." U.S. officials
have said that the vast majority of Salvadorans are "economic refugees," not entitled to political asylum.
The report said ICM tried to help with the legal emigration of 13 of the 35
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with lifetime tenure, are motivated by a need to support Administration foreign policy initiatives in Central America.
Notwithstanding the majority of government successes, asylum
applicants have won some significant victories and have forced several changes in government procedures and interpretations. For example, one circuit court of appeals has held that an individual who
makes a conscious decision to remain neutral in the face of pressure
to take sides can establish persecution on political opinion
grounds. 124 Despite the contrary ruling of two circuit courts of appeals, 125 a United States district judge has entered a preliminary nationwide injunction requiring the INS to specifically notify El
Salvadorans apprehended in the United States of their right to apply

for asylum.1 26 As mentioned earlier, aliens have successfully challenged the standard of proof applied in asylum cases, and have prereturnees who complained of possible persecution. Two succeeded, seven awaited
official decisions and four were rejected as being economic refugees, it said. Of the
other 22, nine were thought to have solved their political problems or not to have
had any; six had left the country on their own (as had about 23 percent of all the
returnees studied), and ICM had lost contact with the other seven.
As of Dec. 31, 1985, ICM had reports that four returnees had died: two by
natural causes, one in a bar fight and the fourth while committing a robbery.
Mathews, El Salvador's Economic Refugees, Washington Post, Sept. 9, 1986, at A9, col. 1.
Critics have disputed the ICM's methodology. Id. See also Williams, Agency Chief Disputes
Need For Sanctuary, San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 22, 1985, at 5.
It is also interesting to note that only a small percentage of denied asylum applicants are
actually deported from the United States. A recent report by the General Accounting Office
showed that of El Salvadorans covered by the study, only 212 out of 8,385 who had asylum
denied by the INS were actually deported or had departure verified. The average rate of removal for denied applicants of all nationalities was two percent. GENERAL AccT. OFF., AsYLUM: UNIFORM

APPLICATION

OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEw

DENIED APPLICANTS DE-

38 (1987) (Briefing Report to the Honorable Arlen Specter, United States Senate).
124. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286-88 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). In
Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit pointed out that
mere apathy was not the same as the affirmative choice of neutrality specified in Bolanos.
125. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (1 Ith Cir. 1984) (en banc), affid, 472 U.S. 846
(1985); Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). See also Duran v.
INS, 756 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1985) (asylum warnings not required when alien designates
county of deportation); cf. Villegas v. INS, 745 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure to advise
aliens who have stated fear of returning to a particular country of right to apply for asylum is
reversible error).
126. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982). See also Nunez
v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982)
(asylum warnings required for Salvadorans and Guatemalans in Southern District of Texas);
Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (asylum warnings required for certain
unaccompanied minors under age 18). The trial on the merits is currently in progress in
Orantes. The trial on the merits in Nunez took place several years ago, but no decision has
been rendered.
PORTED
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vailed before the Supreme Court.1 27 El Salvadoran
claimants have
128
also prevailed in some individual asylum cases.
Individuals interested in supporting the cause of Central American asylum applicants can provide bond for such individuals to get
them out of detention during the deportation hearing process.1 29 In
addition, they can house and support such individuals during the
hearing process.
Individuals questioning the government's policies can, and have,
brought lawsuits directly against the government to challenge such
policies.130 They can, and have, petitioned Congress to change the
law on asylum or to pass legislation requiring the Executive Branch
to grant certain groups extended voluntary departure. 13 1
In terms of enforcement, the government has actually taken a
rather restrained position.13 2 The government has not sought to enter
churches to arrest aliens believed to be in the United States illegally. 133 The government has not prosecuted individuals for well publicized displays or various parades transporting alleged sanctuary
seekers.134 Certainly, the government has never suggested that individuals who disagree with its policies do not have a right to speak
out against, challenge, or resist those policies through the established
legal system.
Even so-called "sanctuary cities" resolutions 3 5 can present a
permissible channel for expression of disagreement, so long as (1)
the issue is fairly and openly debated with an opportunity for full
127. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986); Hernandez-Ortiz v.
INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985); Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1565 (1987).
129. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (1987).
130. See, e.g., supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 59.
132. One commentator has suggested that the government's response has been so restrained as to constitute an abdication of its law enforcement responsibilities to church groups
in violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. Carro, supra note 99, at 77376.
133. See e.g., Harris, INS Chiefs View of Sanctuary Movement, San Francisco Chron.,
Mar. 28, 1986, at II, col. I (quoting INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson: "The government
has shown extreme restraint. We do not infiltrate churches, and we do not go into churches
and arrest people."). "Nelson said the agency does not request search warrants to enter
churches suspected of sheltering Central Americans who claim that they have entered the
United States to escape death, arrest, or torture in their native countries." Id.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Green, Atlanta a 'City of Refuge'?, Atlanta J. & Const., Sept. 1, 1986, at
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input from both sides and the public before action is taken, and (2)
the resolutions do not condone or encourage the breaking or ignoring
of federal laws. Too often, such resolutions appear to be hurried
through local legislative bodies by sanctuary advocates in a manner
calculated to avoid, rather than encourage, a full and informed public debate on asylum and refugee policy. 13 6
Virtually the only place where the government has drawn the
line is where the individuals actively engage in smuggling of undocumented aliens.137 This is a narrow range of prohibited activity, and
one which the courts have recognized as a legitimate government
prerogative. 138
This is not to suggest that the current system relating to refugee
admission, asylum, and withholding of deportation is perfect, or that
it could not be improved. As one commentator has stated:
American asylum law is unfinished and the debate over how to
complete it will last as long as the need for refuge. The key question for lawyers concerned with the rule of law in the world is how
such reform should be undertaken. 3 9
In light of the many opportunities available under our system
for taking legitimate and lawful actions to support disagreement
with government policy, the sanctuary movement's position advocating the violation of federal laws is unreasonable, even if based upon
conscience. 140 Ironically, it is the very fact that our system permits
136.

Voters in Seattle recently passed, by a vote of 55 percent to 45 percent, an initia-

tive rescinding a so-called "sanctuary resolution" passed by the City Council. Earlier in the
year, the Los Angeles City Council repealed a similar resolution. McCaslin, Seattle Voters
Deal Painful Blow to City's Alien-Sanctuary Position, Wash. Times, Nov. 27, 1986, at A2,
col. 1.
137. See INA § 274(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) (prohibiting the bringing in, trans-

porting, and harboring of illegal aliens).
138. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1603
(1987); United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985); cf. United States v.
Pereira-Pineda, 721 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant convicted of transporting undocitmented aliens within the United States); United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 272 (5th Cir.
1985) (transportation of aliens within the United States done in willful furtherance of aliens'
unlawful purpose).
139. Zall, Asylum and Sanctuary: The American Dilemma, A.BA. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at
66, 69.

140. As the First Circuit recently stated:
If we are to continue to absorb refugees and asylum applicants in meaningful

numbers, both the actuality and perception of equity must persist: we must have fair
rules and we must administer them fairly. By the same token, those who wish to

make the United States their home must themselves fairly abide by the system and
its procedures. Each applicant who puts himself above the law not only jeopardizes
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and encourages lawful methods of advocating or achieving change
that distinguishes it from the disorder prevalent in the Central
American countries which send us so many undocumented aliens. To
the extent that the sanctuary movement holds itself above the law, it
strikes at the very heart of our democratic processes and cannot be a
legitimate response to disagreement with government policies.

the process, but also threatens to usurp a place which should be filled by an aspiring
immigrant who has demonstrated a willingness to play by the rules. Sanctuary cannot be built solidly upon such porous foundations.
Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 18 (ist Cir. 1987).
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